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Regulating Experimental AIDS Drugs: A
Comparison of the United States
and France
I. INTRODUCTION
The number of reported cases of Acquired Immunodeficiency
Syndrome ("AIDS") in the United States surpassed 100,000 in Sep-
tember 1989.' These cases accounted for more than half of the
203,599 reported cases worldwide. 2 The United States Center for
Disease Control has estimated that between 800,000 and 1.3 million
people in the United States are infected with the HIV virus that
causes AIDS.3 According to the World Health Organization, the
number of people infected worldwide may be as high as 10 million.
4
While the number of HIV-infected persons who will actually develop
AIDS remains unknown, some researchers believe that virtually all
who are infected will eventually die from the disease.5
Although there is no scientifically proven, effective cure for
AIDS, a number of possible treatments are widely available in other
countries. 6 Yet, due to the stringent regulations and rigorous review
process imposed by the United States Food and Drug Administration
("FDA") on experimental drugs, AIDS victims currently cannot
1. AIDS Update, L.A. Daily News, Sept. 4, 1989, § 4, at 10, col. 4.
2. AIDS Spread Continued in '89, L.A. Times, Jan. 5, 1990, at A34, col. 2. France is
currently third in the number of worldwide AIDS cases, with 7,149 as of September 1989.
Global Cases Near 180,000, 4 AIDS Pol'y & L. (BNA) No. 17, at 10 (Sept. 6, 1989). The
100,000 cases represent the minimum number of persons with AIDS. First 100,000 Cases of
Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome-United States, 262 J. A.M.A. 1453 (1989). Because of
underdiagnosis and underreporting, the reported number of cases underestimates the actual
number of people afflicted with the disease. Id.
3. Steinbrook, Slower Spread ofAIDS in Gays Seen Nationally, L.A. Times, Jan. 5, 1990,
at A l, col. 3. The HIV virus weakens "the body's ability to resist disease by infecting white
blood cells, . . . which are an integral part of the human immune system. As a result, ...
people with AIDS [become] vulnerable to a variety of opportunistic infections and malignant
conditions that generally do not [affect healthy individuals]." I. SLOAN, AIDS LAW: IMPLI-
CATIONS FOR THE INDIVIDUAL & SOCIETY 1 (1988).
4. 8 Million Carrying AIDS Virus, Health Group Says, L.A. Times, Aug. 1, 1990, at A9,
col. 2.
5. Van de Kamp, The Cost of AIDS, L.A. LAW., Sept. 1988, at 31.
6. Jarvis, AIDS: A Global View, 12 NOVA L. REV. 980, 1002 n. 119 (1988). Among these
treatments are fusidic acid in Denmark; foscavir in Sweden; AL-721 in Israel; and ribavirin
and isopronosine in Mexico. Id.
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legally obtain any of these drugs in the United States. 7
Four years after it was first approved, zidovudine (marketed as
AZT) remains the only FDA-approved drug treatment for the HIV
virus.8 While AZT has prolonged the lives of some people with
AIDS, it does not cure the disease. 9 As a result, many desperate
AIDS sufferers are paying exorbitant black market prices for ribavirin
and isopronosine that have been smuggled into the United States from
Mexico, where a person can purchase the drugs over the counter,
without a prescription.' 0 Activist groups have formed underground
networks to import nonapproved drugs from Europe and Japan.1"
Additionally, patients with sufficient financial resources often travel
to Europe seeking effective treatments not available in the United
States. 12
FDA regulations permit use of unapproved drugs only under
strict experimental conditions.1 3 Supporters of the FDA regulations
believe that this process protects the public's best interests by promot-
7. In a speech given May 21, 1987, California Attorney General John Van de Kamp
noted that, because of the long delay in the drug approval process, "over 70 percent of the
drugs eventually approved for use in this country are on the market elsewhere long before
Americans can buy them." JAMES, AIDS TREATMENT NEWS 187 (1989).
8. The FDA officially approved AZT as a treatment for AIDS and severe AIDS-related
conditions in March 1987. Scott & Cimons, AZT Chronology, L.A. Times, Jan. 10, 1990, at
A1S, col. 3. As of March 1989, between 20,000 and 30,000 AIDS patients were receiving
AZT. Burroughs Reports Instances of HIV Resistance to AZT, 4 AIDS Pol'y & L. (BNA) No.
7, at 5 (Mar. 22, 1989). Patients in 37 foreign countries also receive AZT. Jarvis, supra note 6,
at 1002 n.119.
9. I. SLOAN, supra note 3, at 3, 4. AZT's greatest impact on AIDS occurs during the
first twelve to eighteen months of treatment, particularly in patients with less advanced stages
of the disease. Between eighteen and thirty months of treatment, the effect tails off and mortal-
ity increases. The reason for this phenomenon is unknown. Goldsmith, AIDS Drug Develop-
ment Availability Intensify, 262 J. A.M.A. 452 (1989). "It is clear we desperately need
alternative therapy to AZT from the standpoint of... clinical failure of the drug on long-term
dosage." Id. (quoting Dr. Thomas C. Merigan, Director of the National Institute of Allergy
and Infectious Diseases ("NIAID") AIDS Clinical Trial Group).
10. Ticer, 'Fast Buck' Artists are Making a Killing on AIDS, Bus. WK, Dec. 2, 1985, at
47. See also Van de Kamp, supra note 5, at 32. In 1985, a twenty-tablet box of isopronosine
could be purchased for $2.50 in Mexico. AIDS patients in San Francisco then paid up to $1.20
per tablet for the same tablets. R. SHILTS, AND THE BAND PLAYED ON 564 (1988).
11. See Nonapproved Drugs Brought To US, AIDS Law & Lit. Rep., at 31 (Apr. 1989).
12. Ticer, supra note 10, at 47. Actor Rock Hudson attracted major media attention
when he went to France's Pasteur Institute to be treated with the experimental drug HPA-23
shortly before his death from AIDS in 1984. See generally R. SHILTS, supra note 10, at 475.
Some French scientists resented the United States government for placing a low priority on
AIDS treatments, thereby forcing Americans to come to France for treatment with HPA-23.
Id. at 536.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 47-54.
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ing overall safety and efficiency. Critics of the drug approval system
counter that the regulations increase the cost of drug development,
deny Americans access to potentially lifesaving drugs for unnecessa-
rily long periods of time,' 4 and "sacrifice today's AIDS patients in
order to save tomorrow's patients."' 5
Other critics complain that, FDA regulations aside, drug manu-
facturers have failed to show a sincere interest in developing AIDS
treatments because of their concerns about profitability and potential
liability for unknown side effects. ' 6 One commentator has speculated
that, even if a cure for AIDS was found, no manufacturer would be
willing to produce it.17 The low potential for profit due to lawsuits
resulting from unknown side effects, the expense and delay of exhaus-
tive FDA testing requirements,' 8 and recent public pressure over the
high cost of drug treatments combine to inhibit the production of
AIDS drugs. 19
"[AIDS] has been described as 'one of the most devastating in-
fectious diseases the world has ever known' and, [essentially], the
modern equivalent of leprosy."' 20 The urgent and unique nature of the
AIDS crisis presents a serious challenge to the current method of ex-
perimental drug development in the United States. This Comment
14. Delaney, Patient Access to Experimental Drugs, 261 J. A.M.A. 2444 (1989).
15. FDA Eying Underground Trials of Trichosanthin Derivative, 4 AIDS Pol'y & L.
(BNA) No. 13, at 5 (July 12, 1989) (quoting Martin Delaney, Co-director of Project Inform in
San Francisco). Delaney's group organized an "underground clinical trial" of Compound Q, a
drug imported from China, in an attempt to circumvent FDA procedures. Id.
16. The concerns of its liability insurer caused the United States-based manufacturer of
the experimental drug AL-21 to stop Americans from obtaining the drug at hospital trials in
Israel. See Bishop, Desperate Lives, Unknown Risks, CAL. LAW., Sept. 1987, at 46.
17. Huber, AIDS and Lawyers, NEW REPUBLIC, May 5, 1986, at 14.
18. A potential AIDS vaccine developed by Viral Technologies, Inc. of Washington,
D.C., is being tested in Great Britain instead of the United States because company officials felt
that the FDA was taking too long to approve human tests in the United States. Medical
Briefs, 4 AIDS Pol'y & L. (BNA) No. 9, at 8 (May 17, 1989).
19. See Chase, Company Fights Critics as it Collects AZT Profit, L.A. Daily News, Sept.
17, 1989, § 3, at 1, col. 3, for a description of the public pressure applied to Burroughs
Wellcome Co. to reduce the cost of AZT. At the time, AZT cost approximately $8,000 for a
one year supply. Bowing to public pressure, Burroughs lowered the price of AZT by 20%,
thereby reducing the price of a one year supply to $6,400. AZT Price Reduced 20 Percent;
Advocates Urge Further Cuts, 4 AIDS Pol'y & L. (BNA) No. 18, at 3 (Sept. 20, 1989). Drug
manufacturer Pfizer, Inc. likewise reduced the price of fluconazole, a drug used to treat AIDS-
related cryptoccal meningitis, in response to the controversy over the pricing of AIDS drugs.
Zonana, Pfizer Lowers Price of AIDS Drug, Will Provide Some Free, L.A. Times, Feb. 9, 1990,
at Dl, col. 5.
20. James, Holmquest & Blinka, AIDS: A Plague on Institutional Health Policy Develop-
ment, 10 J. LEGAL MED. 65 (1989).
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will examine, compare, and contrast the existing regulatory processes
for experimental drugs in the United States and France. 2' This Com-
ment will also discuss the political, legal, and bureaucratic realities of
this issue. It will conclude with recommendations for dealing with
the problems presented, emphasizing the recent California AIDS
legislation 22 as a possible solution designed both to increase drug
availability and to protect the interests of patients and drug
manufacturers.
23
II. UNITED STATES FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION
REGULATIONS
The federal government's first attempt to protect the public from
dangerous medicinal drugs was the passage in 1848 of An Act to Pre-
vent the Importation of Adulterated and Spurious Drugs and
Medicines ("1848 Act").24 Although the 1848 Act required the accu-
21. During 1983 and 1984, research teams in France and the United States independently
identified the virus that causes AIDS. W. DORNET-rE, AIDS AND THE LAW 6 (1987). In the
early days of the AIDS crisis, the Pasteur Institute in Paris was recognized as the "world's
most important center for treatment research." R. SHILTS, supra note 10, at 496.
22. Arguably, California's response to the AIDS problem sets the standard for reaction at
the state level. "California far outpaces every state in AIDS spending. In fiscal 1989, Califor-
nia spent $76.8 million in state funds on AIDS programs.... California was the only state to
earmark a large portion of its own money for AIDS research: nearly $18 million." AIDS
Update, L.A. Daily News, Sept. 4, 1989, § 4, at 10, col. 1.
23. Although this Comment specifically addresses issues regarding access to experimental
treatment in the context of the AIDS crisis, the problems discussed and the arguments made
are equally applicable to other terminal diseases for which there is no known cure, such as
cancer. The issues are particularly compelling, however as they relate to AIDS, because of its
unique nature as a new infectious disease about which comparatively little is known.
Cancer patients engaged in a similar debate in the 1970s over the right to treatment with
laetrile, a non-FDA approved drug that was available in Mexico. Jarvis, supra note 6, at 1003
n. 119. The controversy reached the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Ruther-
ford, 442 U.S. 544 (1979). In Rutherford, cancer patients brought suit to enjoin the govern-
ment from interfering with the interstate shipment and sale of lactrile. Id. at 549. The Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that the "safety" and "effectiveness" requirements of the Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act, ch. 675, § 505, 52 Stat. 1040, 1052 (1938) (current version at 21
U.S.C. 355 (1988)), had no reasonable application to terminally ill cancer patients. Rutherford
v. United States, 582 F.2d 1234, 1237 (10th Cir. 1978). The court of appeals reasoned that,
because the patients would eventually die anyway, there was no standard by which to measure
the safety and effectiveness of the drug. The court thereafter approved the use of laetrile by
cancer patients certified as terminally ill by licensed medical practitioners. Id. On appeal by
the federal government, the Supreme Court reversed the decision, holding that the Act made
no special provision for drugs used to treat terminally ill patients. 442 U.S. at 552. The Court
refused to imply such an exemption judicially, reasoning that the creation of an exemption for
the terminally ill, as a policy decision, was best left to legislative judgment. Id. at 559.
24. An Act to Prevent the Importation of Adulterated and Spurious Drugs and
Medicines, ch. 70, 9 Stat. 237 (1848).
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rate identification and inspection of imported drugs, it did not regu-
late possibly dangerous drugs manufactured in the United States.25
Attempts to strengthen the 1848 Act were unsuccessful until
muckraking journalism published in the early 1900s brought the
problem to the public's attention. Works such as Upton Sinclair's
The Jungle, which exposed the unsanitary conditions in the meat-
packing industry, resulted in public outcry that prompted Congress to
take action. 26 Congress responded to the pressure by passing the Pure
Food and Drug Act of 1906 ("1906 Act"). 27
The 1906 Act prohibited interstate trade in adulterated or mis-
branded drugs.28 Although it provided greater protection to the con-
sumer than the 1848 Act, the 1906 Act still did not require any pre-
market testing of drugs. 29 For a second time, public pressure forced
Congress to pass stronger legislation. The strong public outcry fol-
lowing the "Elixir Sulfanilamide" tragedy of 193730 prompted Con-
gress to pass the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938
("1938 Act").3' For the first time, the Act required drug manufactur-
ers to prove the safety of a drug before marketing it.
In light of the new, powerful and complex drugs that were devel-
oped in the post-World War II years, Senator Estes Kefauver intro-
duced remedial legislation in 1960 designed to strengthen the 1938
Act. 32 However, the proposed legislation stalled in committee and its
passage appeared unlikely until tragedy once again prompted public
outcry and congressional action. 33 The Thalidomide tragedies in
Western Europe in 1961 and 196234 provoked Congress to pass the
25. Comment, The Right of Privacy in Choosing Medical Treatment, 20 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 693, 696 (1987).
26. RAY & KsIR, DRUGS, SOCIETY AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 34-35 (1987); Comment,
supra note 25, at 696 n.20.
27. Pure Food and Drug Act, ch. 3915, §§ 1-13, 34 Stat. 768 (1906).
28. RAY & KSIR, supra note 26, at 35.
29. Comment, supra note 25, at 697.
30. RAY & KSIR, supra note 26, at 37. More than one hundred people died from using an
untested, poisonous new drug being marketed as an "elixir." The government was able to seize
the product and fine the manufacturer only on the ground that it was misbranded as an elixir.
Id. A true elixir contained alcohol and this concoction did not. If the product instead had
been labeled as a "solution," the government would have lacked the power to take any action
under the 1906 Act. The Evolution of U.S. Drug Law, FDA CONSUMER, Dec. 1987-Jan. 1988,
at 37.
31. Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938, ch. 675, § 505, 52 Stat. 1040, 1052 (1938)
(current version at 21 U.S.C. 355 (1988)).
32. RAY & KSIR, supra note 26, at 38.
33. Id.
34. Pregnant women took Thalidomide, a sedative and sleeping pill, to reduce morning
1990]
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Kefauver-Harris Amendments to the 1938 Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act.3 5 The Kefauver-Harris Amendments ("Amendments"), which
were intended to tighten controls over drug availability, added numer-
ous new regulatory provisions. 36 According to the Amendments,
"[no] person shall introduce or deliver for introduction into interstate
commerce any new drug, unless an approval of an application filed
pursuant to ... this section is effective with respect to such drug. '37
For the first time, manufacturers had to make a scientific pre-
market showing that their drugs were both effective and safe for their
intended uses. "Such person shall submit to the Secretary as a part of
the application .. . full reports of investigations which have been
made to show whether or not such drug is safe for use and whether
such drug is effective in use."' 38 Additionally, the Amendments re-
quired companies to obtain approval for clinical testing on humans
before any such testing could take place. "The Secretary shall pro-
mulgate regulations for exempting from the operation of the foregoing
subsections of this section drugs intended solely for investigational use
by experts qualified by scientific training and experience to investigate
the safety and effectiveness of drugs."13 9 The Amendments further
provided that:
Such regulations may, within the discretion of the Secretary....
provide for conditioning such exemption upon.., the.., making
of such reports to the Secretary, by the manufacturer or the spon-
sor of the investigation .. .of data ... obtained as the result of
such investigational use of such drug, as the Secretary finds will
enable him to evaluate the safety and effectiveness of such drug
40
An application will be denied if there is a lack of "substantial evi-
dence" that the drug will have its purported effect under the use pre-
scribed, recommended, or suggested in its proposed labeling. 41
sickness. Unknown side effects resulted in 3,500-5,000 malformed babies born to mothers who
took the Thalidomide. Although the drug was never approved for sale in the United States,
public awareness and congressional concern arose over the incidents. Id.; see also Note, Fed-
eral Food and Drug Administration Practice and Procedure For New Drug Approval, 37 TEMP.
L.Q. 191, 193 (1964).
35. Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (1962) (codified as
amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (1988)).
36. Note, supra note 34, at 193-94.
37. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (1988).
38. Id. § 355(b)(1).
39. Id. § 355(i).
40. Id. § 355(i)(3).
41. Id. § 355(d). The Act defines "substantial evidence" as:
[Vol. 1 :393
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Under the authority granted in the 1938 Act and its subsequent
1962 amendments, the FDA has developed the world's most compre-
hensive process for approving new drugs.42 This process begins with
preclinical testing of the drug's safety and effectiveness on animals.
43
Next, the drug's sponsor" files an Investigational New Drug applica-
tion ("IND") based on the results of the preclinical testing.45 Once
the FDA approves the IND, clinical testing on humans can begin.
46
The FDA requires three phases of clinical testing.47 Phase 1 tri-
als are conducted on a small number of patients or healthy volunteers
and are designed to measure the drug's safety and toxicity in
humans.4 8 Phase 2 tests normally involve a group of several hundred
patients who suffer from the specific disease. This phase focuses on
determining the drug's effectiveness. 49 Phase 3 testing utilizes ex-
panded numbers of volunteers at clinics and hospitals. This phase is
designed to "clarify the drug's benefit-risk relationship, discover less
common and even rare side effects and adverse reactions, and gener-
ate information that will be incorporated into the drug's professional
labeling, the FDA-approved guidance to physicians and others about
how to use the drug." 50
The testing method required in Phase 3 involves a "double-
blind" test.51 In the double-blind test, half of the participants receive
the drug, while the other half only receives a placebo. 52 Neither the
evidence consisting of adequate and well-controlled investigations, including clinical
investigations, by experts qualified by scientific training and experience to evaluate
the effectiveness of the drug involved, on the basis of which it could fairly and
responsibly be concluded by such experts that the drug will have the effect it purports
or is represented to have under the conditions of use prescribed, recommended or
suggested in the labeling or proposed labeling thereof.
Id.
42. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE-NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, CONFRONTING
AIDS: UPDATE 1988, at 137 (1988) [hereinafter INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE].
43. 21 C.F.R. § 312.23(a)(8) (1990). The United States regulations require a twelve-
month toxicity study at this stage. In contrast, the European Economic Community, of which
France is a member, requires only a six month study. Dunning, Regulation, New Drug Devel-
opment, and The Question of Delay, 41 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 139 (1986).
44. The pharmaceutical manufacturer or a research organization usually sponsors the
new drug.
45. 21 C.F.R. § 312.23 (1990).
46. Id. § 312.20(b).
47. Id. § 312.21.
48. Id. § 312.21(a) (usually twenty to eighty patients or volunteers).
49. Id. § 312.21(b).
50. Flieger, Testing in 'Real People,' FDA CONSUMER, Nov. 1987, at 11-12.
51. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.126(b)(2)(i).
52. The term placebo literally means "I will please." In a general sense, a placebo is any
1990] 399
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doctor nor the patient knows whether the experimental drug or the
placebo has been utilized. 53 Following Phase 3 testing, the drug's
sponsor can file a New Drug application ("NDA") whereupon the
drug becomes eligible for FDA approval.54
Generally, the journey from preclinical testing to FDA approval
can take seven to ten years. 55 The approval process of the non-AIDS-
related drug Lovastatin provides a typical example. Preclinical stud-
ies of Lovastatin began in 1979. In 1984, a new drug IND was sub-
mitted to the FDA. The Lovastatin NDA was submitted in
November 1986. Final approval of the NDA occurred in August
1987-a time lag of over eight years. 56
Recognizing the problems that the slow approval process cre-
ated, the FDA introduced a new procedure in 1987. The purpose of
this procedure, known as "Treatment IND," was to increase access to
experimental drugs at an earlier stage of the approval process. 57
Under Treatment IND, after completing Phase 2 controlled clinical
trials, patients in whom the disease has reached the seriously life-
threatening stage may receive an experimental drug.58 Treatment
IND would apply only to those drugs which show "reasonable evi-
dence of potential benefit" and for which no satisfactory alternative
exists.59 However, unlike drugs with final FDA marketing approval,
which all physicians may prescribe for any patient use, doctors can
prescribe Treatment IND drugs only for specific conditions that the
FDA designates.60
therapeutic procedure without specific activity for the condition being treated. Nielsen, The
Doctor, the Pharmacist, the Patient, and the Placebo, or You're Not My Mother, Doctor, 44
FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 639, 641 (1989).
53. Comment, supra note 25, at 700. Under 21 C.F.R. § 312, the person receiving the
placebo must receive written notification that he or she may be receiving either the active drug
or the placebo and agree to remain in ignorance. Nielsen, supra note 52, at 641.
54. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (1988).
55. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 42, at 137-38.
56. See Flieger, supra note 50, at 14.
57. 21 C.F.R. § 312.34 (1990).
58. Young, Promoting Drug Development Against AIDS and the HIV Infection, 43 FOOD
DRUG COSM. L.J. 215, 218 (1988).
59. The Evolution of U.S. Drug Law, FDA CONSUMER, Dec. 1987-Jan. 1988, at 37.
60. Preliminary FDA Okay Given For Aerosolized Pentamidine, 4 AIDS Pol'y & L.
(BNA) No. 2, at 3 (Feb. 8, 1989). For example, under Treatment IND status, doctors may
prescribe aerosolized pentamidine only to patients who have had at least one episode of AIDS-
related pneumonia or have a T4 cell count below 200. Id. T4 lymphocytes are a type of white
blood cell particularly susceptible to the HIV virus. Krim, The AIDS Virus and its Public
Health Implications, in LEGAL, MEDICAL AND GOVERNMENTAL PERSPECTIVES ON AIDS AS
A DISABILITY 3 (1987).
400 [Vol. 13:393
Regulating Experimental AIDS Drugs
In February 1988, Trimetrexate became the first AIDS treatment
available as a Treatment IND drug.61 In late September 1989,
designation of Dideoxyinosine (DDI) as a Treatment IND followed. 62
However, as Treatment IND drugs, these drugs are available only to
those AIDS patients in whom the disease has reached an advanced
stage and who have shown an intolerance to AZT. In October 1989,
AZT became available for the first time as a Treatment IND drug to
children under the age of thirteen who suffer from AIDS or advanced
infections from the AIDS virus.
63
Despite some progress in expediting the availability of experi-
mental drugs, the prevailing philosophy of the FDA remains the
same: the overall, best interest of the public is served by not releasing
drugs for use until controlled clinical trials have clearly shown that
the drugs are safe.64 Former FDA Commissioner Frank Young has
stated: "[w]e want the public to know and understand that miracles
don't happen overnight, that studies take years not months, and that
patients are best served by rigorous testing and careful review." '65
III. DRUG REGULATION IN FRANCE
Historically, the French government has not regulated consumer
protection as comprehensively as the United States. Only in the last
fifteen years has this area of French law grown substantially.66 Com-
mentators attribute this belated development to "laissez-faire" eco-
nomic policies and to the general belief that an economic system
based on free competition would protect the consumer. 67 However,
61. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 42, at 138.
62. FDA Okays Wider Availability of DDI in Trials, IND Status, 4 AIDS Pol'y & L.
(BNA) No. 18, at 6 (Oct. 4, 1989).
63. Cimons, Children to Get AIDS Drug AZT Under New Rule, L.A. Times, Oct. 26,
1989, at Al, col. 3. Although AZT was approved for adults in 1987, children could not use
the drug because of the FDA policy that denies children access to a drug until it has been
tested on, and approved for, adults. This generally causes a two to three year time lapse be-
tween approval for adults and approval for children. Id. According to a spokeswoman for
Burroughs, Inc., the manufacturer of AZT, gaining approval for pediatric use of AZT took
longer than for adult use because there are fewer child AIDS patients and because the FDA
traditionally requires more data for pediatric drugs. FDA Approves Use of AZT For Children
Under 13, 4 AIDS Pol'y & L. (BNA) No. 20, at 7 (Nov. 1, 1989).
64. Farley, Benefit vs. Risk: How FDA Approves New Drugs, FDA CONSUMER, Dec. 1987,
at 6.
65. Id.
66. Minor, Consumer Protection In French Law: General Principles and Recent Develop-
ments, 33 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 108 (1984).
67. See CALAIS-AULOY, CONSUMER LEGISLATION IN FRANCE: A STUDY PREPARED
FOR THE EC COMMISSION 1 (1981).
1990]
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the inequalities between parties which developed as a result of rapid
economic growth in the post-World War II period fueled the develop-
ment of French consumer protection law during the 1950s and
1960s. 68 The immediate post-war period brought government inter-
vention and regulation into areas not previously regulated. 69 Public
health was foremost among these areas.
70
The Office of Pharmaceutical Control, which reports to the Min-
ister of Public Health, oversees the quality of medical drugs and phar-
maceutical products in France.71 Generally, manufacturers of
products capable of putting the life or health of the consumer at risk
must obtain a "visa" or authorization before marketing.72 An author-
ization for a medical drug will be granted if the manufacturer estab-
lishes the harmlessness of the drug and proves high manufacturing
standards. 73 Further, pharmaceutical goods must conform to strict
standards concerning manufacture, composition, packaging, labeling,
and advertising.
74
The French marketing authorization is temporary and requires
periodic renewal. 75 In 1982, France established the National Com-
mission on Drug Monitoring to facilitate the gathering of data on ad-
verse reactions to drugs subject to authorization. Its primary
functions include "compil[ing] and evaluat[ing] information on the
unexpected or toxic effects of medicaments subject to the marketing
authorization referred to in Article L 601 of the Public Health
Code."' 76 Regional centers acting on behalf of the National Drug
Monitoring Commission compile information about the drugs from
hospitals, physicians, dentists, midwives, and nurses.77 This informa-
tion is used when evaluating an authorization for renewal. The cen-
ters also oversee investigations and studies as requested by the
Minister of Public Health.78 Adverse reaction reports for drugs avail-
68. Id. Inequalities developed between enterprisers and suppliers, on the one hand, and
the disadvantaged consumer on the other. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 5. The regulations in this area appear in the Code de la santdpublique (Public
Health Code). Id.
72. Id. at 22.
73. Id. (referring to arts. L 601 and L 605 of the Code de lo santipublique).
74. Id. (referring to arts. R 5117 and R 5143 of the Code de la sante publique).
75. Id. (referring to art. R 5137 of the Code de la santlipublique).
76. Journal Officiel de la Ripublique Franqaise, Edition des Lois et Dicres Recueil Dalloz,
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able on the French market are shared with other member nations of
the European Economic Community ("EEC").79
The French drug approval process utilizes a system of "exper-
tises" which involves more hospital-based clinicians in the decision-
making process than the United States system. 0 Advisory committee
restraints which burden the United States administrative procedures
do not bind the French system. Rather, the French method focuses
on opinions developed from hands-on clinical review."'
The French authorization system requires clinical investigations
conducted in France on French citizens prior to granting approval.8 2
However, the French testing requirements are not as demanding as
those in the United States.8 3 Likewise, the French philosophical ap-
proach to these trials is very different than the FDA's.8 4 Unlike the
FDA's Phase 3 requirement for controlled studies, French clinical tri-
als do not require the use of a placebo control group.85 Rather, doc-
tors at France's premier research facility, the Pasteur Institute,
consider the use of double-blind studies cruel and inhumane because
the unfortunate patient receiving a placebo has no chance of surviv-
ing. These doctors believe that every patient who seeks treatment
should receive it.86
The United States is one of the last pharmaceutical markets in
the world that is free from the restraints of government subsidy.8 7 As
such, high development costs do not directly affect the federal govern-
ment. In contrast, the French government controls and pays drug
costs as part of the national social security program.88 This direct
financial involvement significantly affects the French drug approval
79. O'Reilly, Three Dimensions of Regulatory Problems: United States, European Eco-
nomic Community, and National Laws, 41 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 131, 138 (1986).
80. Id. at 134.
81. Id.
82. See Tedrow, Drug Registration Abroad, 37 TEMP. L.Q. 59, 65 (1963) for an interest-
ing 1963 American observer's comment that the French system resulted in unreasonably long
(two year!) delays.
83. See Hoffman, Advising the Multinational Firm Under the Federal Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act, 41 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 145, 146 (1986). In order to facilitate subsequent
importation, multinational pharmaceutical firms have been advised to structure their drug re-
search programs in foreign countries to meet the additional burden of tougher FDA standards.
Id.
84. See id.
85. See R. SHILTS, supra note 10, at 496.
86. Id.
87. Kruezer, International Drug Registration, 43 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 559, 560
(1988).
88. BUSINESS INTERNATIONAL, FRANCE IN TRANSITION 43 (1979).
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process. This type of regulatory system views the advanced efficacy of
a drug as a trade-off, to be balanced against higher developmental
costs.89 "Efficacy and market price decisions in the European drug
systems are direct government economic decisions, made at the time
of market entry by the national reimbursement authorities. The Eu-
ropean nations control entry on value grounds, within the very differ-
ent context of a national system for governmentally controlled drug
marketing .... "90 Because it ultimately subsidizes the cost of drugs
to the French consumer, the French government has taken steps to
encourage the pharmaceutical industry to establish research opera-
tions and manufacturing in France, rather than to continue to import
drugs from abroad. 91
IV. PRODUCT LIABILITY AND PROFITABILITY
IN THE UNITED STATES
Uncertainty regarding the liability of pharmaceutical companies
that manufacture AIDS treatments has slowed the development of
these drugs in the United States. 92 Drug manufacturers are con-
cerned about the potential for liability that arises from supplying a
drug which is administered during the experimental treatment stage.
93
Potentially, patients who take experimental drugs may suffer immedi-
ate adverse reactions or long-term, unanticipated side effects. 94 Addi-
tionally, the market for AIDS drugs does not seem as potentially
profitable to some manufacturers as the market for treatments for
more common diseases.95
Product liability concerns particularly affect the development of
an AIDS vaccine. As another commentator noted:
[T]he pragmatic barriers to testing, licensing, and marketing [a
vaccine] are staggering. Demonstrating the efficacy of the vaccine
would require large groups of willing human subjects at high risk
of infection. Confirming the safety of the ... vaccine would have
to take into account issues of liability for perceived complications
of immunization-problems that are even more complex than
89. O'Reilly, supra note 79, at 133.
90. Id.
91. Kruezer, supra note 87, at 560.
92. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 42, at 139.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. R. SHILTS, supra note 10, at 475. "A drug for a few thousand AIDS patients would
never offer the opportunity for profit that a [treatment for] ... hypertension would." Id.
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those that accompany existing vaccines for familiar infectious
diseases.9
6
Furthermore, regardless of the precautions taken, adverse reactions to
the drug might not appear until some time after the premarketing
testing.9
7
Generally, manufacturers are not liable for injuries resulting
from properly produced vaccines. 98 However, some courts in recent
years have imposed liability even though the manufacturer exercised
the appropriate duty of care.99 In describing this development in his
hornbook on torts, Dean Prosser noted that "courts have held that
strict liability for failure to warn of a risk will be imposed on a manu-
facturer if, had he known of the danger, he would have been negligent
for failing to warn of such risk."' ' ° For example, in Reyes v. Wyeth
Laboratories,°'0 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a strict lia-
bility claim against a polio vaccine manufacturer. 102 In Reyes, an in-
fant contracted paralytic polio two weeks after immunization with the
polio vaccine. 103 Although the manufacturer had included an insert
in the packaging warning doctors and nurses of the potential dangers,
this warning was not relayed to the vaccinees or their guardians. 104 In
finding that the manufacturer had a duty to warn the individual vac-
96. Osborne, The AIDS Epidemic: Discovery of a New Disease, in AIDS AND THE LAW:
A GUIDE FOR THE PUBLIC 26 (1987). In August 1989, June Osborne, Dean of the University
of Michigan School of Public Health, was selected as the chairperson of the National Commis-
sion on AIDS. New AIDS Commission Convenes, Elects June Osborne as Chair, 4 AIDS Pol'y
& L. (BNA) No. 15, at 2 (Aug. 9, 1989).
97. Mariner & Gallo, Getting to Market: The Scientific and Legal Climate for Developing
an AIDS Vaccine, 15 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 17, 20-21 (Summer 1987). Mariner and Gallo
assert
[t]he safety of a vaccine is likely to remain in question even after it has been licensed
and distributed. Adverse reactions may not be discovered even in the most carefully
constructed clinical trials. Since such trials typically involve only a few thousand
participants, reactions that occur as rarely as once in 100,000 or 1,000,000 vaccina-
tions are not likely to be seen during premarketing tests. But they may manifest
themselves once the vaccine is in regular use nationwide, with unfortunate conse-
quences for all.
Id. at 21.
98. Bishop, supra note 16, at 111.
99. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 692-94 (W. Keeton 5th ed. 1987).
100. Id. at 697.
101. 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974). Interestingly, the
same Wyeth Laboratories halted manufacture of a whooping cough vaccine in 1984, citing
increases in insurance and litigation costs. A number of other companies have left the vaccine
market in the last fifteen years for the same reasons. See Huber, supra note 17, at 15.
102. Reyes, 498 F.2d at 1272.
103. Id. at 1270.
104. Id.
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cinee, the court held that failure to provide an adequate warning
"when it is required will present a 'defect' in the product and will,
without more, cause a product to be 'unreasonably dangerous as mar-
keted.' "105 Thus, the manufacturer was strictly liable because of the
failure to warn the plaintiff of the risk inherent in the vaccine. '0 6 Fur-
thermore, cases such as Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp. 1
0 7
have increased manufacturers' exposure to liability by weakening the
defense that a product conformed to the industry's state of the art at
the time of its manufacture, such that the manufacturer could not
have warned of the defect. 108
These developments have caused concern among prospective
vaccine producers. 10 9 These producers fear that the liability exposure
resulting from unforeseen adverse reactions might exceed the profit
generated from sales of the vaccine."10 Concerned pharmaceutical
manufacturers need only look to the problems encountered during the
1976 Swine Flu epidemic to confirm their apprehension." 11 Govern-
ment-sponsored mass inoculation against a predicted Swine Flu out-
break resulted in serious, unexpected complications. Thousands of
people developed Guillain-Barre syndrome, a severe, generalized par-
alytic disease, as a side effect of the Swine Flu vaccine. 1 2 Claims filed
as a result of the inoculations were further complicated by the fact
that
[a]dverse reactions to the vaccines [were] initially logged by re-
cording any untoward events that occur[red] in immunized indi-
viduals within several weeks following immunization .... Mass
immunization automatically [brought] to the surface all the ills to
which human beings are prone, many of which have unknown
causes and [were] therefore ascribed to the vaccine by a litigious
105. Id. at 1265.
106. Id. at 1277-79. Following Reyes, a number of courts held manufacturers strictly lia-
ble for failure to warn vaccinees directlq of risks associated with the vaccines that they re-
ceived. See, e.g., Givens v. Lederle, 556 F.2d 1341 (5th Cir. 1977) (Sabin polio vaccine);
Unthank v. United States, 732 F.2d 1517 (10th Cir. 1984) (Swine Flu vaccine).
107. 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982).
108. See Huber, supra note 17, at 15.
109. Mariner & Gallo, supra note 97, at 21.
110. Id.
111. The government feared a potential flu epidemic of the proportion not encountered
since 1918-19, when the flu claimed over 500,000 lives. In response, the federal government
planned the largest mass inoculation in the nation's history. M. FRANKLIN, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES 742 (4th ed. 1987).
112. Bishop, supra note 16, at 111.
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public. "13
Ultimately, plaintiffs claiming damages from adverse side effects filed
over 5,000 claims. The United States government paid out over $83
million in victim compensation." 14
FDA Commissioner Frank Young summarized the problems
with respect to this area of the law by stating that "we are really at
sea" in trying to anticipate the effects of liability law on the produc-
tion of an AIDS vaccine. 115
V. PRODUCT LIABILITY IN FRANCE
While French product liability law is considered to be one of the
most protective legal structures of the European Community," l6 it
still is not as well-developed as its counterpart in the United States."i
7
Although remedies under tort, contract, and penal theories do exist,
the recoverable damages are smaller than those in the United
States." i8 One explanation for this difference is the "principle of
French law that compensation should not be of a punitive nature;
therefore courts will award only what is deemed equitable in order to
'repair the damage.' ,19 Additionally, "[iun the vast majority of
[French] product liability cases, an expert is designated by the court
to determine the cause of the injury and frequently to put a monetary
amount on [the damages] suffered."'
120
In the French system, the plaintiff must establish the existence of
fault before a manufacturer will be subject to liability in tort for dam-
ages.' 2 1 To recover, the injured party must show that the supplier
intentionally or negligently committed an act or omission relating to
113. Osborne, supra note 96, at 26. For example, the deaths of three people over age 70
who died the day after each received the flu shot attracted much media attention. The public
was not persuaded by the Center for Disease Control's explanation that about ten to twelve
deaths occur on the average each day among people 70 to 74 years of age, and therefore, these
deaths were not necessarily attributable to the vaccine. Reitze, Federal Compensation for Vac-
cination Induced Injuries, 13 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 169, 179 (1986).
114. M. FRANKLIN, supra note 111, at 742.
115. Mariner & Gallo, supra note 97, at 23.
116. SARRAILHE, PRODUCTS LIABILITY, A MANUAL OF PRACTICE-FRANCE 5 (1981).
117. MOQUET-BORDE, DOING BUSINESS IN FRANCE § 8.01, at 8-3 (1989).
118. Id.
119. SARRAILHE, supra note 116, at 8.
120. Bouckaert & Byrd, Product Liability Defense in France, DEF. COUNS. J. 538 (Oct.
1987).
121. CALAIS-AULOY, supra note 67, at 28. In contractual disputes, establishing this evi-
dence presents little difficulty because it is sufficient to merely state the fact that the manufac-
turer or distributor failed to achieve the promised result. Id.
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the product. 122 This includes an obligation on the part of the manu-
facturer to advise and inform the consumer regarding the proper use
and risks of the product, particularly those in areas of high technol-
ogy or those new to the market. 123 The injured party must also prove
a direct causal relationship between a legally cognizable injury and
the fault of the supplier. 124 Meeting this burden of showing a defect
and causation is difficult. As a result, the French courts tend to inter-
pret conservatively the adequacy of warnings and instructions. 125
In determining the fault of the supplier, the objective standards
comprising the custom of the particular trade establishes whether a
defect exists in the product. Customs in the pharmaceutical trade are
considered particularly demanding. Therefore, drug manufacturers
must meet a higher standard than those in other industries.126 In ad-
dition, manufacturers must act with "prudence and diligence."' 27
Under this standard, a French court has held that "a pharmaceutical
laboratory distributing a product which carries certain risks but
which is the only treatment available for certain ailments, is not
judged to be negligent. The concept of negligence is assessed in the
light of other factors."' 128
Generally, in the past, the French legal system has protected the
manufacturer. However, one should note that this situation is likely
to change in the very near future. France, as a member nation of the
EEC, probably will pass new, comprehensive products liability legis-
lation in compliance with the EEC Directive of July 25, 1985 Con-
cerning Defective Products. 129 This Directive130 imposes strict
liability on the manufacturer, seller, or importer of defective prod-
ucts. 131 The Directive focuses on providing "fair apportionment of
122. MOQUET-BORDE, supra note 117, § 8.02[2][a][i], at 8-5. For example, a supplier
could be subject to tort liability under a negligence theory if "he failed ... to warn the injured
party of the inherent dangers of the product that he installed." Id.
123. SARRAILHE, supra note 116, at 12.
124. MOQUET-BORDE, supra note 117, § 8.02[2][c], at 8-7.
125. See Bouckaert & Byrd, supra note 120, at 544.
126. CALAIS-AULOY, supra note 67, at 29.
127. Id. at 28-29.
128. Id. at 38, n.213 (referring to Civ. 19 May 1973, Bull. Civ. I, No. 181, at 161).
129. MOQUET-BORDE, supra note 117, § 8.01, at 8-3.
130. European Economic Community Council of Ministers Directive of July 25, 1985 Relat-
ing to the Approximation of the Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions of the Mem-
ber-States Concerning Liability for Defective Products, 28 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L210) 29
(1985) [hereinafter Directive].
131. Thieffry, EEC Directive 85/3 74 on Liability for Defective Products: Implementation
and Practice, in PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, LITIGATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTISE
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the risks inherent in modem technological production."' 132
Of all industries, the pharmaceutical industry has the greatest
potential for increased liability claims as a result of the Directive.
133
However, one commentator has noted that "while product liability
has had a significant impact on American industry in terms of cost
and disincentives for innovation, the general feeling is that the liabil-
ity potential will most likely not be as severe in Europe . . . ."
There are two reasons for this conclusion. First, awards for pain and
suffering are not allowed under the Directive. 35 Second, European
countries do not provide for jury trials in civil cases, which are gener-
ally believed to lead to higher awards. 36 The EEC Directive also
contains a proposed provision "that a producer's total liability for
damage resulting from a death or personal injury and caused by iden-
tical items with the same defect shall be limited to an amount which
may not be less than 70 million Ecu."'
1 37
VI. INFORMED CONSENT AND THE RISKS OF
EXPERIMENTAL DRUGS
Over the past forty years, the trend in United States drug law has
been toward tighter control. This control is intended to protect the
public by identifying harmful substances before they arrive on the
market. 38 When the FDA promulgated the current regulations, the
medical profession generally did not believe that it was necessary to
inform unknowing patients of the experimental or investigational na-
ture of the drug being tested on them. Likewise, doctors often did not
inform their patients that the prescribed treatment drug did not have
FDA approval. 139
SERIES, No. 371, EEC STRICT LIABILITY IN 1992: THE NEW PRODUCT LIABILITY RULES 13
(1989).
132. Whitehead, Product Liability and European Integration in Light of the EEC Strict
Liability Directive, in PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, LITIGATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE
PRACTISE SERIES, No. 371, EEC STRICT LIABILITY IN 1992: THE NEW PRODUCT LIABILITY
RULES 66 (1989).




137. Directive, supra note 130, art. 16-1.
138. See Janssen, The U.S. Food and Drug Law: How It Came; How It Works, 35 FOOD
DRUG COSM. L.J. 132 (1980).
139. See Sobel, Policy Considerations of the IND Rewrite, 43 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 185,
186-87 (1988) for a discussion of the attitude toward and abuses of informed consent in the
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The 1962 Amendments to the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act
remedied this problem by requiring that
experts using such drugs for investigational purposes certify to
such manufacturer or sponsor that they will inform any human
beings to whom such drugs, or any controls used in connection
therewith, are being administered, or their representatives, that
such drugs are being used for investigational purposes and will ob-
tain the consent of such human beings .... 140
Despite the change in the medical profession's attitude toward
the importance of obtaining the patient's informed consent, and the
presence of added legislative safeguards, the FDA still maintains that
[c]areful FDA review is necessary and mandated by law to mini-
mize the risk of allowing potentially unsafe and ineffective prod-
ucts from coming onto the market. Unsafe products cause
unnecessary suffering. Ineffective ones raise false hopes, cause the
patient to defer the use of other more effective measures, and are
burdensome and economically costly besides.
14
1
In comparison, under French case law, a physician has a duty to
warn a patient of the possible risks associated with a recommended
therapy, in order to obtain his informed consent. 42  If injury does
occur, the patient bears the burden of establishing that he did not
consent to the treatment or procedure. 43 The application of this ap-
proach to drug testing allowed French researchers at the Pasteur In-
stitute to "eagerly test all ... sorts of drugs on AIDS patients, all of
whom were more than willing subjects since they knew the alternative
to treatment was death."' 44
The problem that the AIDS crisis presents is quite different than
those resulting from other diseases. As of this writing, no clearly ef-
fective treatment exists. Additionally, the disease appears to be inevi-
tably fatal. 45 Desperate AIDS sufferers are crying out for access to
treatment drugs which they know are still experimental and un-
early 1960s that prompted tighter regulatory control of the experimental drug investigation
process.
140. 21 U.S.C. § 355(i) (1962).
141. Norris, FDA's AIDS Program, 12 NOVA L. REV. 1103 (1988) (John Norris is the
chief operating officer of the FDA).
142. Carbonneau, The Principles of Medical and Psychiatric Liability in French Law, 29
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 742, 749 n.46 (Oct. 1980).
143. Id. at 749.
144. R. SHILTS, supra note 10, at 496.
145. See supra text accompanying note 5 regarding the belief that virtually all who cur-
rently suffer from AIDS will eventually die as a result of the disease.
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proven. Arguably, under these special circumstances, such individu-
als should be allowed to make that choice.
Under the informed consent doctrine, the patient essentially per-
forms a risk-benefit analysis, balancing the potential risks of treatment
against the potential benefits.' 46 "To be informed, a person must be
appraised of the risks and benefits of the proposed procedure, the al-
ternative procedures if any, and of not having the procedure carried
out at all."'' 47 A person with AIDS would weigh the detriment of not
having access to any experimental treatment (almost certain death),
the unknown potential benefits of experimental treatment (a possible
cure), and the risk of unknown side effects from the drug. Until a
proven alternative exists, doctors should provide AIDS patients them-
selves with sufficient information on which to base their informed
consent. Faced with the consequences that the lack of an effective
treatment present, the patient should be allowed to risk exposure to
unforeseen side effects or ineffective treatment if he or she so chooses.
The regulation of experimental drugs is intended as a protective
measure. However, when the protective intent delays access to poten-
tially beneficial treatments, and no viable treatment alternatives exist,
the regulations no longer benefit those whom they are designed to
protect. In such a situation, a patient should have the option of giving
his or her informed consent to an unproven treatment, once the drug
has been shown to be nontoxic.
One AIDS activist group proposes that a number of proven non-
toxic drugs should be released to the public immediately, even if test-
ing for potential side effects is incomplete. 48 Given the disease's fatal
nature and the lack of any proven effective treatments, the patients
themselves should weigh the potential for unknown harmful side ef-
146. Informed consent is the name for a general principle of law that a physician has a
duty to disclose what a reasonably prudent physician in the medical community in
the exercise of reasonable care would disclose to his patient as to whatever grave
risks of injury might be incurred from a proposed course of treatment, so that a
patient, exercising ordinary care for his own welfare, and faced with a choice of
undergoing the proposed treatment, or alternative treatment, or none at all, may
intelligently exercise his judgment by reasonably balancing the probable risks against
the probable benefits.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 701 (5th ed. 1979).
147. DORNETTE, AIDS AND THE LAW 7 (Supp. 1989).
148. Dawsey, 80 Arrested As AIDS Protest Broken Up, L.A. Times, Oct. 7, 1989, at B4,
col. 1. In June of 1989, ACT UP/N.Y., an AIDS activist group, announced the names of five
drugs (DDI, EPO, fluconazole, foscarnet and GM-CSF) which they felt should be made avail-
able immediately because enough was already known about them from underground and
clinical testing. Sadownick, ACT UP and the Politics of AIDS, L.A. Weekly, Oct. 6, 1989, at
23.
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fects against the risk of foregoing treatment. Arguably, patients
whose lives are threatened should be allowed to make an informed
choice as to how much risk they wish to bear. That choice should not
be made by a regulatory bureaucracy.
1 49
VII. THE DEBATE OVER CLINICAL TESTING
The argument generated by the required Phase 3 placebo trials is
essentially an ethical one: "Is it ethical to give a placebo to patients in
drug studies whose condition is serious or life threatening for the pur-
pose of drug studies?"' 50 For a test participant who receives only the
placebo, the government's ultimate determination that the drug is in-
deed effective in fighting AIDS may come too late and at the expense
of the test participant's life. Opponents of the testing process contend
that "in such cases all patients should be given the experimental drug,
since it offers at least some hope, where the placebo offers none."'
5 1
However, adherents to the FDA philosophy counter that to abandon
the use of the placebo "would defeat the purpose of the clinical trial,
making it impossible to learn whether the experimental drug does, in
fact, have any more effect than no treatment at all."'
15 2
To further its goal of protecting the public as a whole, the FDA
maintains that "the importance of controlled clinical trials cannot be
overemphasized, particularly in the case of a poorly understood dis-
ease such as AIDS."'153 Consistent with this philosophy, the FDA has
denied approval of new drug applications for AIDS treatments be-
cause the supporting data was derived from compassionate-use proto-
cols rather than from placebo-controlled trials, 5 4 and because the test
conditions did not measure up to strict FDA standards. 155 The FDA
attitude can be summed up by FDA Medical Officer Alexander Flem-
ing's statement that:
[I]t's a disservice... to let even a dying patient use an unproven
drug unless qualified physicians believe it has some chance of help-
ing. . . . A "try anything" approach prevents physicians from
149. See Delaney, supra note 14, at 2444.
150. Flieger, supra note 50, at 12.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Hecht, AIDS Progress Report, FDA CONSUMER, Feb. 1986, at 35.
154. See Delaney, supra note 14, for a discussion of the FDA's denial of a license to obtain
ganciclovir.
155. See Bishop, supra note 16, at 48, for a discussion of the FDA's denial of expanded
ribavirin use.
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quickly learning whether a drug works, and that's a disservice to
others similarly ill who could be helped by an effective drug.'
56
Some commentators suggest that once an effective drug is found,
the efficacy of future experimental drugs should be measured against
it rather than against a placebo.157 However, because so much is still
unknown about the HIV virus and AIDS, some researchers maintain
that it will be a long time before they can abandon placebo-controlled
trials altogether.1
5
Even if the medical community discontinued placebo use in
clinical trials, allowing access to treatment drugs only through partic-
ipation in trials raises other problems. Access to space in clinical trial
programs is often limited for other reasons. For example, intravenous
drug users and prostitutes, two groups with a high incidence of AIDS,
are traditionally excluded from clinical trials.' 59 Likewise, research
centers which conduct trials are generally concentrated in academic
centers of major cities, thus making access to trials difficult for pa-
tients in suburban and rural areas.16°
Regulators maintain that restricting access to experimental drugs
to clinical trial participants is necessary because "patients would not
enter studies, especially placebo-controlled studies, if they could get
the desired experimental drug some other way. Thus, they feel they
must nobly restrict access to force participation in clinical studies, for
the benefit of all."' 6 ' However, one can argue that forcing partici-
pants to enter controlled studies as the only means of access to a de-
sired drug damages the study's accuracy. The problems cited include
widespread use of concurrent treatments, pooling of drugs to mini-
mize the risk of receiving a placebo, and rapid drop-out rates once
156. See Farley, supra note 64, at 6.
157. Macklin & Friedland, AIDS Research: The Ethics of Clinical Trials, 14 L. MED. &
HEALTH CARE 273 (Dec. 1986). For example, one protocol for the testing of DDI called for a
randomized, double-blind comparison of DDI and AZT, rather than a placebo. Bristol-Myers
DDI (VIDEX) Treatment IND Approved for People with AIDS, Severe ARC Who Are Intolerant
to AZT, The Blue Sheet, Oct. 4, 1989, at 2 [hereinafter Bristol-Meyers DDI Treatment IND
Approved].
158. Macklin & Friedland, supra note 157, at 274.
159. Levine, Has AIDS Changed the Ethics of Human Subjects Research, 16 L. MED. &
HEALTH CARE 167, 171 (Winter 1988).
160. Id. The UCLA Medical School was criticized in late 1989 for charging AIDS patients
a $260 "consultation fee" to determine their eligibility to participate in clinical trials con-
ducted at the school. Garcia, UCLA Criticized for Charging Fees to AIDS Patients in Drug
Studies, L.A. Times, Nov. 15, 1989, at BI, col. 1. Critics felt that the practice excluded minor-
ities and the poor from experimental treatment.
161. Delaney, supra note 14, at 2444.
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patients learn that they are receiving a placebo. 162 Arguably, volun-
tary rather than forced participation would produce more accurate
results.
Given the importance that the FDA places on the use of clinical
trials, the issue becomes whether it is ethical for the FDA to place
greater emphasis on its long term regulatory needs than on the imme-
diate needs of individual patients. 163  In an international context,
United States proceduralism is excessive.164
Different cultures often make different value judgments about
important life-sustaining drugs and acceptable levels of risk. 165 For
example, the French do not require placebo testing and view the prac-
tice as morally objectionable. 166 A number of United States critics,
such as Dr. Mathilde Krim, founder of the American Foundation for
AIDS Research, have adopted a position very close to that of the doc-
tors at the Pasteur Institute and maintain that "it is inhumane to deny
those who otherwise inevitably will die the opportunity to use any
drug they can-even if they are not enrolled in a clinical trial."'167
The needs of the patients seeking treatment must be balanced
with the needs of researchers. Dr. Anthony Fauci, director of the
National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases ("NIAID"), has
suggested a "parallel track" program wherein Phase 2 drugs would be
made available to patients who do not otherwise qualify for clinical
trials. 168 When implementing this idea during the testing of DDI, the
FDA required patients who desired the drug to seek enrollment in a
clinical trial first before considering them for Treatment IND or com-
passionate-use distribution of the drug. 169 Although the FDA ex-
pressed support of the "parallel track" concept when it was proposed
in June 1989,170 this system had not been officially implemented as of
162. Id.; see Grady, Look, Doctor, I'm Dying: Give Me the Drug, DISCOVER, Aug. 1986, at
78-86, for an extensive general discussion regarding the problems and issues raised by the first
clinical trials of AZT in 1986.
163. Delaney, supra note 14, at 2444.
164. O'Reilly, supra note 79, at 135. "[United States] proceduralism has been carried to
extremes, and... it may need to change to make it more compatible with the world market's
needs." Id.
165. Id.
166. See supra text accompanying notes 84-86.
167. N. KRIEGER & R. APPLEMAN, THE POLITICS OF AIDS 226 (1986).
168. Fauci Urges 'Parallel Track' Program; Critics Say ddl Trial Plan Isn't Working, 4
AIDS Pol'y & L. (BNA) No. 22, at 1 (Nov. 29, 1989).
169. Bristol-Myers DDI Treatment IND Approved, supra note 157.
170. Goldsmith, supra note 9, at 452.
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Dr. Marvin Zelen, a Harvard public health scientist, has pro-
posed a major overhaul of the current approach to clinical trials of
potential AIDS treatments.1 72 This proposal, called the "Open Proto-
col System,"' 73 is similar in several respects to the French system.
This approach would eliminate the use of placebos in the clinical tri-
als of AIDS drugs, with emphasis placed instead on varying drug dos-
ages and testing combinations with other drugs. 174 The second part of
Zelen's proposal focuses on "learn[ing] something from every AIDS
patient,"' 17" by involving physicians throughout the country, not just
those at university research hospitals, in the collection of AIDS treat-
ment data.' 76 This portion of the proposal resembles the French
Drug Monitoring system, which collects data from all levels of the
medical health professions in France. 177 Such a monitoring system, if
implemented in the United States, would balance the needs of re-
searchers and patients. An extensive, centralized monitoring system
would allow access to experimental treatments even to those not in-
volved in trials, while still providing necessary data to researchers.
VIII. ADDRESSING THE VACCINE LIABILITY ISSUE
The current doctrine of strict liability for pharmaceutical manu-
facturers in the United States has evolved primarily over the last
twenty years. Developments in this field are sometimes described as
dramatic, illogical, inconsistent, and confusing. 78 However, the Eu-
ropean Community is moving to adopt a strict liability standard as
well.' 79 Special action must address the problem as it relates to the
development of an AIDS vaccine, for the current state of the law hin-
ders drug manufacturers' interest in development of a vaccine. If fear
of liability stops producers from pursuing research or seeking to mar-
ket a vaccine, the battle against AIDS will have lost a valuable
171. Cimons & Steinbrook, 6 AIDS Patient Deaths May Renew Drug Debate, L.A. Times,
Mar. 10, 1989, at A27, col. 1.
172. Scientist Proposes New Way of Conducting Clinical Trials, 4 AIDS Pol'y & L. (BNA)
No. 1, at 2 (Jan. 25, 1989).




177. See supra text accompanying notes 76-79.
178. Maedgen & McCall, A Survey of Law Regarding the Liability of Manufacturers and
Sellers of Drug Products and Medical Devices, 18 ST. MARY'S L.J. 395, 397 (1986).
179. See supra text accompanying notes 129-37.
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weapon. 80
The federal government previously addressed the problem of lia-
bility for unknown side effects caused by vaccines on two occasions.
The government first approached the vaccine liability issue in 1976, at
the time of the predicted Swine Flu epidemic. 81 On the advice of the
Center for Disease Control, Congress appropriated funds for a mass
inoculation program against the Swine Flu. 182 In the wake of the po-
tential for manufacturers' liability foreshadowed by Reyes v. Wyeth
Laboratories,8 3 neither drug manufacturers nor their insurers were
willing to undertake the risk of providing the vaccine. 8 4 To ensure
that the public could obtain the inoculations, Congress passed the
Swine Flu Act, 8 5 which imposed liability upon the United States for
any damages that arose from the vaccine. 8 6
Under the Swine Flu Act, the United States replaced the named
defendants in any suit, resulting from the Swine Flu vaccine, 8 7 which
the plaintiff originally filed against a manufacturer or distributor of
the vaccine, or any private or public health care facility which had
provided the vaccine at no cost. 8 8 The United States reserved the
right to bring an action against any vaccine manufacturer whose neg-
ligence resulted in an award.18 9 The government eventually paid out
over $83 million in damages under the Act for side effects which de-
veloped from the vaccine. 190
The federal government next addressed the vaccine liability prob-
lem ten years later in 1986. Throughout the early 1980s, the number
of drug manufacturers willing to produce vaccines had dropped dra-
matically. 191 In response to pressure from parents' groups, vaccine
manufacturers, and medical groups, Congress enacted the National
180. Mariner & Gallo, supra note 97, at 23.
181. See supra text accompanying notes 111-14.
182. See Bishop, supra note 16, at 111.
183. 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974).
184. M. FRANKLIN, supra note 111, at 742.
185. 42 U.S.C. § 247b (1988).
186. For an extensive discussion of the Swine Flu Act, see Reitze, supra note 113.
187. 42 U.S.C. § 247b(k)(2)(A).
188. Id. § 247b(k)(1).
189. Id. § 247b(k)(7).
190. See supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text.
191. M. FRANKLIN, supra note 111, at 742-43. Between 1963 and 1986, the number of
American companies producing the vaccine to immunize children from diphtheria-pertussis-
tetanus (DPT) fell from eight to one. Id.
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Childhood Vaccine Injury Act. 192 This Act created a federal compen-
sation system for reactions and lasting injuries caused by seven child-
hood disease vaccines. 193
The Act set up a special statutory scheme, under which claims
are brought in federal court and heard by an appointed special
master. 194 Liability depends on a no-fault system, in which proof of
whether the injury is vaccine-related is determined by reference to a
table of specific vaccine-related injuries. 195 Proof of an enumerated
injury or illness raises a presumption of liability. On the other hand,
those with a nonenumerated injury must show a connection between
the vaccine and the injury. 196 The amount of the eventual award can
include actual reimbursable medical expenses, 197 rehabilitation
costs,198 lost wages, 199 and reasonable legal fees.200 However, awards
for pain and suffering are capped at $250,000.201 Furthermore, puni-
tive damages may not be awarded. 20 2 The government provides fund-
ing for the system by charging a special excise tax on the sale of the
vaccine.20 3
Under existing French law and the proposed EEC Directive, sev-
eral factors combine to limit a manufacturer's exposure to liability in
France.2°4 By incorporating some of these same limiting factors, the
United States can remove some of the disincentives to the develop-
ment of an AIDS vaccine. Specifically, such legislation could include
a prohibition or limitation on punitive damages, as well as on pain
and suffering damages. Furthermore, this legislation could impose a
cap on total liability from a vaccine.
The federal government has the ability to address the AIDS vac-
cine issue with specific legislation, as it has done on previous occa-
sions with the enactment of the Swine Flu and Childhood Vaccine
Injury Acts. Nevertheless, the federal government has taken no ac-
192. National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755 (1986)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
193. Id.
194. M. FRANKLIN, supra note 111, at 743; see also Bishop, supra note 16, at 112.
195. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-14(a).
196. Id. § 300aa-Il(c).
197. Id. § 300aa-15(a).
198. Id. § 300aa-15(a)(1)(A)(iii)(II).
199. Id. § 300aa-15(a)(3)(A).
200. Id. § 300aa-15(e).
201. Id. § 300aa-15(a)(2), (4).
202. Id. § 300aa-15(d).
203. Id. § 300aa-15(i)(2).
204. See.supra text accompanying notes 116-37.
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tion to date. However, California has independently addressed the
problem at the state level. The California legislature recognized "a
decrease in the willingness of pharmaceutical companies to become
involved in vaccine research, development, and manufacturing be-
cause of uncertain profitability and perceived and actual marketplace
risks and disincentives. ' 20 5 It further determined that "[w]ithout
state intervention to assure minimal profitability of an AIDS vaccine,
inadequate incentives may exist for the private sector to commit re-
sources and expertise to the accelerated development of an AIDS
vaccine." 20
6
To remedy this problem, California lawmakers passed legislation
in late 1986 which created an AIDS Vaccine Victims Compensation
Fund, 20 7 an AIDS Vaccine Guaranteed Purchase Fund,20 8 and an




The purposes of the AIDS Vaccine Victim Compensation Fund
is to provide a source of recovery for injuries proximately caused by
an AIDS vaccine. 210 Under the program, injured parties may recover
medical costs, 2 11 loss of earnings, 2 12 and pain and suffering damages
which do not exceed $550,000.213
With the AIDS Vaccine Guaranteed Purchase Fund, the State of
California guaranteed the purchase, at a designated price, of at least
500,000 units of an AIDS vaccine within three years of its approval
by the FDA.214 The legislature hoped that this guarantee would as-
sure the development of such a vaccine.
215
The AIDS Vaccine Research and Development Grant Program
also focused on "encourag[ing] AIDS vaccine research by the private
sector" by providing an additional source of funding.216 Under this
program, if a grant recipient develops an AIDS vaccine, the State of
California would be entitled to reimbursement from royalties made
from the sale of the vaccine, at the rate of $1 per dose until full repay-
205. CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 199.45(1) (West 1990).
206. Id. § 199.45(o).
207. Id. § 199.50.
208. Id. § 199.51.
209. Id. § 199.56.
210. Id. § 199.47(d).
211. Id. § 199.47(d)(1).
212. Id. § 199.47(d)(2).
213. Id. § 199.47(d)(3).
214. Id. § 199.51.
215. Id.
216. Id. § 199.55(h).
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ment of the grant. 21 7
In passing these acts, California has taken an important and ag-
gressive step in addressing the problems inherent in the development
of an AIDS vaccine. 218 This legislation is currently the only legisla-
tion of its kind in the nation. Congress should use its legislative
power, as it has done previously in addressing the Swine Flu and
childhood disease vaccine problems, to enact similar national legisla-
tion to encourage development of an AIDS vaccine.
IX. BUREAUCRATIC ENTANGLEMENTS
One major bureaucratic impediment to drug approval is the
"matter of how much data is enough and who should make that value
judgment. ' 21 9 An example of this problem is the approval process of
ganciclovir, a drug used to fight CMV-retinitis, an AIDS-related in-
fection which causes blindness. Over 3,600 patients have used
ganciclovir on a compassionate-use basis since 1984.220 Treating
opthamologists reported dramatic evidence that the drug successfully
arrested blinding eye infections caused by CMV-retinitis. 22, In 1987,
despite the opinion of the two opthamologists on the committee re-
garding the drug's effectiveness,222 the FDA Anti-Infective Drug Ad-
visory Committee did not approve the drug because the data came
from compassionate-use treatments rather than controlled trials.223
After completion of further clinical trials with the same results, the
drug eventually received approval in June 1989.224
Ganciclovir was widely available in Europe before its approval in
217. Id. § 199.60.
218. The California legislation has successfully encouraged research and development of
an AIDS vaccine within the state. As of March 1990, three potential vaccines were undergo-
ing research in the state as a result of the legislation. Zonana, Firm Gets State OK to Test
AIDS Vaccine, L.A. Times, Mar. 6, 1990, at A3, col. 4. The most promising potential vaccine
being researched under the California program is a vaccine containing inactivated HIV virus,
developed by a team headed by famed polio vaccine developer Jonas Salk. Petit, Top Scientists
Predict Vaccine for AIDS Before End of Century, L.A. Daily News, June 23, 1990, at 21, col. 3.
219. Lasagna, Promising Drugs Deserve Faster Approval, L.A. Times, Oct. 19, 1989, at
B15, col. 1. The statute's language requires "substantial evidence" of a drug's effectiveness
before approval. See supra text accompanying note 41.
220. Delaney, supra note 13, at 2444; Ganciclovir Approved for AIDS-Related CMV-Reti-
nitis, The Blue Sheet, June 28, 1989.
221. Despite Promise in AIDS Cases, Drug Faces Testing Hurdle, AIDS L. & LIT. REP.,
Jan. 1989, at 6, col. 2.
222. Lasagna, supra note 219.
223. The Blue Sheet, supra note 220.
224. Id.
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the United States. 225 While the FDA insists that "its people are the
experts," 226 the French approval system of "expertises" utilizes hospi-
tal-based clinicians in the review process. 227 The French focus on
hands-on clinical review decreases the importance of administrative
proceedings and its resulting bureaucracy, and permits wider availa-
bility of a treatment while data is still being collected.
To expedite the drug approval process in the United States, the
FDA should implement procedures modeled after the French system
of "expertises." Rather than delaying promising drugs while adminis-
trative committees make decisions, such a system would allow the
opinions of clinicians in the field to provide the "substantial evidence"
of the drug's effectiveness necessary for approval.
While not admitting that the FDA creates a bottleneck for new
drug approval, the AIDS Activities Oversight Committee noted in its
report that:
the FDA could become an impediment to speedy availability. The
committee believes that FDA resources for new drug approval
should be commensurate with the task. The need to borrow per-
sonnel from other parts of the agency should be relieved; the need
for space, which appears particularly acute, should also be
addressed.
228
Critics have pointed to bureaucratic problems within the FDA
itself as being a major obstacle blocking the swift availability of AIDS
treatment drugs.
What is wrong with the FDA? Compared to the drug regulatory
agencies of other countries, it is huge. Yet it is said to be too small
for its innumerable responsibilities. Its headquarters in Maryland
is cheerless and inadequate in space, wiring and temperature con-
trol. These conditions and low pay scales discourage top-notch ap-
plicants for staff positions, and many senior posts are unfilled. 229
Many drug manufacturers have reported difficulty in obtaining
new drug approval. 230 Some AIDS activists have accused the FDA of
reacting more favorably and more quickly to drugs sponsored by the
National Institute of Health ("NIH"), which conducts clinical trials
225. Despite Promise in AIDS Cases, Drug Faces Testing Hurdle, AIDS L. & LIT. REP.,
Jan. 1989, at 6, col. 2.
226. Lasagna, supra note 219.
227. See supra text accompanying notes 80-81.
228. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 42, at 138-39.
229. Lasagna, supra note 219.
230. Van de Kamp, supra note 5, at 32.
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of some drugs, than to other promising drugs submitted by other
sources. 23' To challenge this practice, a public interest law group
sued FDA Commissioner Frank Young and the NIH in June 1987 on
behalf of all persons infected with AIDS.232 Among other things, the
lawsuit charged that the NIH and the FDA accelerated their consid-
eration and approval of AZT while ignoring or delaying consideration
of other promising drugs.233 Although the court dismissed the suit on
procedural grounds,234 the criticisms have merit.235
The FDA's bureaucratic problems have severely inhibited the de-
velopment of necessary AIDS treatments. To remedy this problem,
the federal government should allocate sufficient resources to fund a
separate program within the FDA. This program should concentrate
exclusively on coordinating the finding, testing, and distribution of
AIDS treatments on a streamlined and expedited basis.
X. POLITICAL REALITIES
"The two principle conditions which have historically led to ma-
jor food and drug legislation have been the existence of a persuasive
leader ... and the occurrence of a crisis in which the weaknesses of
existing protective legislation are exposed to the public through the
news media. ' ' 236 Despite the fact that over 100,000 Americans have
contracted this deadly disease, no strong leader has stepped forward
and the government has been slow to take action against AIDS.
Political considerations inevitably affect how the government re-
acts to controversial situations. AIDS activists and sympathetic poli-
ticians have criticized both the Reagan and Bush administrations for
an uncaring attitude and inadequate response to the AIDS threat.237
President Ronald Reagan did not publicly discuss AIDS until
231. Id.
232. National Gay Rights Advocates v. Department of Health and Human Services, No.
87 Civ. 1735, (D.D.C. Apr. 26, 1988).
233. Bishop, supra note 16, at 48.
234. On April 26, 1988, the court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss on the ground
that the plaintiffs' had failed to exhaust the appropriate administrative remedies. National Gay
Rights Advocates, No. 87 Civ. 1735 (D.D.C. Apr. 26, 1988).
235. Perhaps in response to the recent public criticisms of the numerous problems within
the FDA, Dr. Frank Young stepped down from his position as Commissioner of the FDA in
late 1989. See FDA Chief Gets New Post but is Seen as Scapegoat, L.A. Times, Nov. 14, 1989,
at Al, col. 1. As of September 1990, no successor had been named.
236. J. O'REILLY, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION 3-19 (1989).
237. See Pink Sheet, 49(26), June 29, 1987 at 8-9; Simpson, Using Rage to Fight the
Plague, TIME, Feb. 5, 1990, at 8.
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1987.238 President George Bush has likewise been unresponsive to
AIDS concerns. 2
39
To date, the majority of people who have contracted AIDS are
homosexual and bisexual men and intravenous drug users.24° Many
people believe that those who suffer from AIDS are somehow respon-
sible for having the disease241 and that to research treatments would
"merely encourage unhealthy behavior. ' 242  It appears that
"[b]ecause a majority of the victims [of AIDS] are homosexual or are
otherwise stigmatized by society, the authorities who control medical
funds have been unwilling to finance the comprehensive campaigns
required to develop preventive and therapeutic regimens. '243
Larry Kramer, a high-profile AIDS activist and founder of ACT
UP (AIDS Coalition to Release Power) states this belief in even
stronger terms:
Why has there been such complacency about AIDS?... [T]here is
no question ... [that it is] ... because of who it's happening to. I
mean, you can say all you want about denial, but this is happening
to black people and to Hispanic people and to people who take
drugs and to gay people and to babies who are born out of wed-
lock, and these are all people that a lot of other people would just
as soon weren't there.
2 4
238. S. PANEM, THE AIDS BUREAUCRACY 29 (1988).
239. President Bush declined an invitation to deliver a speech at the Sixth International
Conference on AIDS, held in San Francisco in June 1990. This refusal marked the first time in
three years that the host nation's leader did not address the conference. Zonana, Bush Won't
Address SF. Conference on AIDS, L.A. Times, Feb. 11, 1990, at A3, col. 5. One critic stated,
"[T]he President has good reason for not coming. Neither the city of San Francisco nor the
scientific community think much of his AIDS policies." Id. at A34, col. 5.
240. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 42, at 51. In May 1988, 63% of reported AIDS
cases were homosexual or bisexual men, 19% were heterosexual intravenous drug users, and
4% had contracted the disease through heterosexual contact. Id.
241. Patrick Buchanan, a conservative columnist and former Reagan speechwriter, once
wrote, "The poor homosexuals-they have declared war upon Nature, and now Nature is
exacting an awful retribution." Brandt, AIDS: From Social History to Social Policy, 14 L.
MED. & HEALTH CARE 231, 235 (Dec. 1986). CBS commentator Andy Rooney likewise gen-
erated controversy during his 1989 year-end special when he lumped "homosexual unions"
with cigarettes, alcohol, and other "self-induced ills" that lead to early death. Rosenberg, Is
CBS News Guilty of Andy Rooney-Bashing?, L.A. Times, Feb. 10, 1990, at F7, col. 2.
242. Brandt, supra note 241, at 235.
243. Editorial, A Social Disease, THE NATION, Sept. 14, 1985, at 195-96.
244. Simpson, supra note 237, at 8. Blacks and Hispanics make up 12% of the general
population but they make up 39% of the AIDS patients in the United States. Rogers, The
Medical Profession and AIDS, 10 J. LEGAL MED. 1, 5 (1989). Blacks and Hispanics also
account for 81% of the heterosexual cases of AIDS. Margolis, Outreach and Counseling Ef-
forts for High Risk Partners of HIV Infected Individuals, 10 J. LEGAL MED. 59, 61 (1989).
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In contrast to the United States' perception of the disease,
French doctors consider the preoccupation with the homosexual as-
pect of AIDS a strange American idiosyncracy. 2 5 Early in the AIDS
crisis, the French doctors warned of the threat the disease posed to all
people. 246 As long as the American public continues to perceive
AIDS in this narrow manner, expensive government action to speed
the availability of treatment drugs remains unlikely. However, statis-
tics now prove that the French perception of the disease is accurate,
and that in the future, AIDS will no longer be just a "gay disease. ' 24 7
The United States Center for Disease Control has noted that "AIDS
cases are likely to increase each year in the United States. Most of the
increase will occur in cases involving intravenous drug use, heterosex-
ual transmission and perinatal infections of children. ' 248
Additionally, as more of the estimated 800,000 to 1.3 million
people in the United States who are currently infected with the HIV
virus begin to actually develop AIDS symptoms, 2 49 public opinion
may become more sympathetic. 2 0 In the very near future, 251 the na-
ture and extent of the AIDS epidemic will compel the public and gov-
ernment to recognize the need for terminally ill AIDS victims to have
access to experimental drugs as soon as possible. For those currently
suffering from AIDS, this recognition will come too late.
XI. CONCLUSION
AIDS constitutes a worldwide epidemic of an entirely new, infec-
tious, and as of today, inevitably fatal disease unlike any faced in
modern history. Because of the unique nature of the challenge that
AIDS presents, the current "business as usual" approach taken by the
federal government and the FDA is inadequate. FDA administrative
regulations have overdeveloped to the point where they actually harm
245. R. SHILTS, supra note 10, at 511.
246. Id. The initial hesitation of French health officials to deal with AIDS stemmed in-
stead from viewing it as an "American problem" that did not fundamentally affect France. Id.
at 546.
247. Steinbrook, supra note 3, at Al, col. 3.
248. Id. at A34, col. 1.
249. See supra text accompanying note 4.
250. According to the Center for Disease Control, 85% of those estimated to be infected
with the AIDS virus are not aware that they are infected. AIDS Update, L.A. Daily News,
Feb. 19, 1990, § 4, at 8, col. 3.
251. See Katz, AIDS Isn't Leveling Off, L.A. Times, Feb. 12, 1990, at BI0, col. 3, for one
health care provider's opinion that thousands of people will develop AIDS in the next several
years because the peak years of HIV infection were 1983-1985, and the interval between infec-
tion and diagnosis is seven to ten years.
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those that they were designed to protect. Remedial steps must be
taken and a new and different approach developed. In conclusion, the
following recommendations, which incorporate useful aspects of the
French system, are offered:
1. Until an undeniably effective remedy for AIDS is found, all
experimental AIDS treatments demonstrating reasonable promise of
effectiveness should be made available to the public once the drug has
been proven safe and nontoxic in the preliminary testing stage. The
government has a less compelling need to protect the terminally ill
from unknown side effects of experimental drugs than the public at
large. Furthermore, the needs of people with AIDS, who are facing
almost certain death, are best met by allowing the patient and his
physician to make an individual, informed choice whether to assume
the risk of treatment with an unproven drug.
2. The treatment needs of people with AIDS should not be sac-
rificed to meet the needs of researchers. The use of placebos in
clinical trials, viewed abroad as inhumane, and a product of excessive
American proceduralism, should be eliminated. All patients involved
in a trial should receive the drug. The drug's effectiveness can instead
be measured against other drugs, a combination of drugs, or varying
dosages.
3. The United States should adopt the French approach and try
to learn something from every AIDS patient. A monitoring network
which tracks the effects of treatment drugs in widespread use by
utilizing all levels of the medical profession should be implemented.
This system would continue to provide researchers with needed data
while still allowing patients access to the treatments.
4. Treatment with a drug in the clinical trial stage should not
be limited to only those patients participating in a trial. Those unable
to participate in clinical trials because of reasons beyond the control
of the patient, such as geography, lack of space, lack of funds, or
other disqualifying factors should be given access to the drug regard-
less of trial participation.
5. Within the FDA, a single-purpose, streamlined program de-
voted exclusively to finding, testing, and developing AIDS treatment
drugs on an expedited basis should be established to help minimize
the time lag in the approval process. The French approval system
involves more hospital-based clinicians in the approval process. Im-
plementation of such a system in the United States would help relieve
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the bureaucratic bottleneck for the release of new drugs created by the
current advisory committee restraints.
6. Congress should address the vaccine liability problem by en-
acting national AIDS-Vaccine legislation, similar to the 1987 Califor-
nia legislation, to subsidize and encourage AIDS research, and to
provide protection for both drug manufacturers and potential victims
of unknown side effects. Additionally, this legislation should adopt
the limitations on damages recommended by the EEC Directive on
Strict Product Liability: no punitive damages, no award for pain and
suffering, and an overall cap on liability for incidents from the same
product.
7. The general public and the government must recognize that
AIDS is not a problem which affects only isolated and unpopular seg-
ments of the population, but is instead a major health crisis which
must be faced by all. Ignoring the problems presented by AIDS will
not make the problem disappear. Only by strong public support and
decisive government intervention can this challenge be met.
Anne E. Wells
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